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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between intra-couple income distribution and subjective well-
being, using nationally representative data from Hungary. We show that the association between the 
woman’s relative income (the woman’s share of the couple’s total income) and life satisfaction is 
negative not only for men, but for women as well. Because we control for financial disadvantages on 
the individual and household level, as well as for socio-economic and job characteristics of the 
respondent and their partner, the result can be interpreted as the impact of traditional gender roles and 
the persistence of the traditional male breadwinner mentality. In addition, we show that gender norms 
moderate this negative association. Among those with low levels of traditional norms, the woman’s 
relative income has no effect on life satisfaction, whereas among those who prefer traditional gender 
roles, the negative association is stronger. Our results suggest that conflicts between the gender norms 
and the social and economic reality reduce life satisfaction. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decades, subjective indicators of quality of life have gained growing significance 
in social sciences and social policy (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Dolan and White, 2007; 
Diener et al., 2009; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009; Helliwell, Layard and Sachs, 2015). The 
impact of income and income distribution on subjective well-being is especially widely 
researched. Evidence about the effect of income inequalities (Alesina, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2004; Hajdu and Hajdu, 2014; Schröder, 2016; Kelley and Evans, 2017), absolute 
and relative income (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; D’Ambrosio and Frick, 
2012; Card et al., 2012) are well-known results of this research field. Although the effect of 
income comparison and different comparison groups are widely studied, intra-couple income 
distribution is a less researched area. The effect of intra-couple income distribution on the 
partners’ subjective well-being can be considered as a special type of comparison that is 
primarily influenced by the partners’ preferred contributions to the household budget and 
gender norms. 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between intra-couple income distribution and 
subjective well-being, using nationally representative data from Hungary. Our main research 
question is whether the partners’ life satisfaction is influenced by the intra-couple income 
distribution in the household. In addition, we also explicitly address the role of gender norms 
in this process. 
This study might be especially interesting because in Hungary the prevalence of 
traditional values and gender roles is high, but in a European perspective the education and 
labor force participation gap between men and women is relatively low. Women’s education 
level is above men’s, and their activity rate is getting closer to men’s. This leads to some tension 
between attitudes/preferences and the economic reality. Analyzing the relationship between the 
woman’s relative income and her partner’s satisfaction provides interesting insights about the 
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effect of this tension, which is likely to be growing in the future, unless there is a substantial 
change in gender norms. 
Previous research on this issue used Western European and American data (Rogers and 
DeBoer, 2001; Bonke, 2008; Furdyna, Tucker and James, 2008; Ahn, Ateca-Amestoy and 
Ugidos, 2014; Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan, 2015; Eirich and Robinson, 2017). It has found 
mostly negative associations between women’s relative income and men’s financial or marital 
happiness, whereas the results are mixed and less conclusive for women. In these papers, the 
negative associations are interpreted as the effect of the “male breadwinner mentality” or gender 
norms. However, most of these studies do not provide explicit empirical evidence: only a small 
number papers tested the moderating effect of traditional values, and only two of them found 
partial support for it. 
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, previous studies used data mostly from 
Western Europe and from the USA, but evidence from Eastern Europe is still missing, although, 
it is special region regarding traditional gender norms and values (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; 
Lück, 2005). Our results could reveal interesting evidence about the dynamics of intra-couple 
income distribution and subjective well-being in a more traditional social environment. Second, 
the moderating effect of gender norms on the individual level is rarely tested. In this study, we 
analyze whether the association between intra-couple income distribution and satisfaction is 
indeed different for those who prefer equal gender roles and those who prefer traditional gender 
roles. Third, we investigate how the type of relationship (cohabiting vs. marriage) changes the 
effect of the woman’s relative income.  
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we review the previous literature (Section 2), 
then, we briefly describe gender attitudes and gender gaps in terms of education and labor force 
participation in Hungary (Section 3). In Section 4, we present the data and the estimation 
method. In Section 5, we show our results, and how gender norms moderate the results, and 
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lastly, we show the estimations in the subsamples of married and cohabiting respondents. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Theoretical background and literature 
One of the well-known results of the literature is that one’s income compared to the income of 
others (relative income) is an important determinant of subjective well-being (Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Clark, Kristensen and Westergård-
Nielsen, 2009). Co-workers and friends are considered the most common reference groups, but 
partners can be seen as a special type of comparison group.  
The main mechanisms that connect relative income and subjective well-being are the 
effect of social comparison, i.e. status effect (Veblen, 1899; Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2008) 
and the effect of providing information about future prospects, i.e. signal effect (Hirschman and 
Rothschild, 1973; Senik, 2005; Clark et al., 2009). However, regarding within family income 
comparison these mechanisms seem to be less important.  
Becker (1981) describes task specialization within family as the key to optimized 
functioning and marital quality. In Becker’s view, task specialization provides the highest 
utility for the household. Although this theory is “gender neutral”, according to the traditional 
roles the man specializes in market work and earns income and the women responsible for the 
domestic work and is not active on the market. This means that task specialization, i.e. men’s 
income share supposed to be positively correlated with the partners’ satisfaction. Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2007), however, argue that technological improvements, the growing service sector, 
and the increase in women’s accumulation of human capital reduced the benefits from task 
specialization and increased women’s labor force participation. Therefore, the role of task 
specialization is less important in the twenty-first century. Instead, subjective well-being of the 
partners is influenced mainly by the prefered contributions to the household budget and by the 
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actual situation (Brennan, Barnett and Gareis, 2001; Ahn et al., 2014; Zhang, 2015; Bertrand et 
al., 2015). 
First, the partners’ contribution to the household budget results in higher satisfaction as 
the own contribution might determine the proportion of private consumption, might indicate 
higher rewards of her/his work, and also can result in more bargaining power. Someone with 
higher relative income compared to his/her partner might get more recognition from others 
(including recognition for work), might use more resources of the household, and might have 
greater influence on the decisions of the household (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1996; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Halleröd, 2005).1 Consequently, the own income share 
could indicate higher satisfaction. 
Second, for our paper, it is more important that gendern norms might moderate the 
relationship between relative income and subjective well-being (Greenstein, 1995; Brennan et 
al., 2001; Zhang, 2015; Eirich and Robinson, 2017). Preferred intra-couple income distribution 
is shaped by attitudes regarding gender roles, but the actual income distribution may differ from 
the preferred one due to a number of constrains (e.g. labor market opportunities). The tension 
between the preferences and the economic reality could result in lower satisfaction, but there 
might be a substantial heterogeneity. Traditional norms prescribe that the man should earn more 
than the woman, whereas egalitarian gender role attitudes reject the male breadwinner–women 
homemaker model. It means that the woman’s economic contribution could have different 
consequences on the partners’ satisfaction depending on their gender norms. 
Only a handful of papers analyze the effect of intra-couple income distribution on 
subjective well-being. They use domain satisfactions, e.g. financial satisfaction or marital 
 
1 For example, Browning et al (1994) using a sample of Canadian couples showed that higher-income partners 
receive more of the expenditures of the household. (For similar analysis see also Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 
(1997) or Ward-Batts (2008).) Friedberg and Webb (2006) analyzed directly who has “the final say” when making 




happiness, as outcome variables, and most of these papers take into account gender norms for 
the theoretical interpretation of the results, but they do not provide empirical evidence for its 
moderating effect. 
The vast majority of research concentrates on the USA and Western-Europe. Using data 
of 11 Western-European countries, Bonke (2008) found that wives’ financial satisfaction 
increases with their relative earnings, whereas husbands’ financial satisfaction declines the 
more their wife earns. Only in the Scandinavian welfare states do both women and men prefer 
more or less egalitarian intra-household income distribution. Ahn, Ateca-Amestoy, and Ugidos 
(2014) have analyzed Spanish and Danish data concluding that Spanish women’s financial 
satisfaction decreases as their own contribution to the household income increases, but men are 
more satisfied the higher their own contribution is. They interpret the result as evidence of the 
male breadwinner mentality among Spanish men and women. On the other hand, regarding 
Denmark, where gender attitudes are more egalitarian, they have found that the effect of an 
individual’s share of labor income on financial satisfaction is positive for men and for 
cohabiting women.2 
Using American data, Rogers and DeBoer (2001) have found that married women’s 
marital happiness and psychological well-being are higher, but married men’s psychological 
well-being is lower when women’s relative contributions to the family income are increased. 
The authors conclude that “it is possible that the persistence of breadwinning expectations for 
men leads them to feel distress when women’s proportional contributions increase, regardless 
of their own ability to contribute resources” (Rogers and DeBoer, 2001, p. 470). Using 
American married couples Bertrand et al (2015), in turn, examined how the wife’s relative 
income affects marriage quality. They have found that couples where the wife earns more than 
the husband tend to rate their marriage less happy, are more likely to think that their marriage 
 
2 They have found an insignificant effect for married women. 
6 
 
is in trouble, and are more likely to report that they have discussed separation over the past 
year. This behavior is consistent with the social norm that “a man should earn more than his 
wife” (Bertrand et al., 2015, p. 572).  
Only a small number of papers provide explicit empirical analysis about the role of 
traditional values in the process of within-household income comparison. Furdyna, Tucker, and 
James (2008) analyzed the relationship between marital happiness and wife-to-husband income 
ratio in a sample of employed American wives. They found that the woman’s higher income 
was strongly associated with lower marital happiness among religious African American wives 
(taking religiosity as an indicator of traditional values) and also among white wives with 
traditional gender values, whereas in other groups the relationship was less negative or was 
insignificant. They interpret the results “as illustrative of the expectations held for male 
economic behavior in traditional conceptions of marriage and the discontent that ensues when 
such expectations are unfulfilled” (Furdyna et al., 2008, p. 341). On the other hand, Eirich and 
Robinson (2017) found that full-time working married American individuals are more satisfied 
with their family’s financial situation when they earn more money than their spouse – whether 
they are women or men. However, the authors have also found that traditional gender ideology 
does not moderate this association, and they conclude that social comparison processes (relative 
deprivation) can trump the traditional prescription of the male breadwinning role. Similarly, 
Brennan, Barnett and Gareis (2001) found no evidence that gender-role ideology moderates the 
relationship between women’s relative earnings and marital quality in a sample of dual-earner 
American couples. In a sample of Chinese wives, Zhang (2015) found that feminine role 
attitudes moderated the relationship between wives’ relative income and marital happiness. For 
wives with a low egalitarian feminine role attitudes, wives’ relative income was negatively 
related to marital happiness, whereas it was unrelated to marital happiness for respondent with 
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a high egalitarian feminine role attitudes. However, in this study the moderating effect of 
breadwinner role attitudes was not supported. 
To sum up, a negative association between the women’s relative income and the 
indicators of subjective well-being for women was found only in countries where traditional 
gender norms are stronger (Zhang and Tsang, 2013; Ahn et al., 2014; Zhang, 2015) or in social 
groups with traditional values (Furdyna et al., 2008). In other samples, the results seem to show 
rather the effect of subjective and objective rewards of income (or the effect of social 
comparison processes). 
Evidence on this topic from outside Western-Europe and North-America is scarce, 
despite the fact that gender norms and preferred gender roles are different in other regions and 
countries (Lück, 2005), which might have consequences on the effect of intra-couple income 
comparison on subjective well-being.3 
3.  Gender attitudes and gender gaps in Hungary 
Compared to Europe, in Hungary the acceptance of traditional values and traditional gender 
roles is high (Lück, 2005; Pongrácz, 2006; Takács, 2008). The widespread prevalence of 
traditional roles is reflected by the fact that the Hungarian gap between the employment rates 
of women with and without children under 12 is among the highest in Europe4, i.e. it is women 
who tend to take care of children, which is in accordance with the traditional role specialization 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 37). The traditional attitudes can also be illustrated with the 
 
3 Studies on the division of employment among partners are also related to our research. Only one study, focused 
explicitly on the effect of specialization and hours-equity and analyzed the moderating effect of gender role 
attitudes (Blom, Kraaykamp and Verbakel, 2017). It found that egalitarian gender attitudes led to a more positive 
association between hours-equity and satisfaction and to a more negative association between specialization equity 
and satisfaction for men. Other papers found mixed results regarding the effect of the division of employment on 
relationship satisfaction (Amato et al., 2003; Keizer and Schenk, 2012; Hardie, Geist and Lucas, 2014). All of 
these papers used data form Western Europe and the United States. 




data of the 2010 European Social Survey. In Hungary, average agreement with two statements 
regarding gender roles (“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than 
women”, “A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her 
family”) is among the highest in the 27 participating European countries. On a 5-point scale, 
53.5% and 54.0% of Hungarians answered that they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the 
statements, respectively. In addition, a recent Eurobarometer survey found that Hungary has 
one of the highest scores on the “gender stereotype” and on the “gender stereotype in politics” 
indices, indicating a strong tendency to stereotype based on gender (European Union, 2017). 
These traditional attitudes seem to have been quite stable over the last twenty years. 
According to International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data, the agreement with the 
statement “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family” 
was similar in 1988 and 2012 (40.6% and 43.3%, respectively) and it was relatively high 
compared to other European countries. 
On the other hand, the economic reality seems to be (at least partially) contradicting the 
gender attitudes. The gender wage gap decreased between 1986 and 2003 in Hungary (Lovász, 
2010). Men’s and women’s labor market participation rates and their education level were 
becoming increasingly similar over the 20th century. Figure 1 depicts the historical educational 
differences between women and men between 1950 and 2010 and activity rate differences 
between 1996 and 2015. In 1950, men were six times more likely to have a university degree 
than women; while in the 2000s the female/male gap diminished and in 2010 women have more 
university degrees than men. Between 1996 and 2015, the ratio of activity rate of women and 
men in the 25-59 age group increased from 0.75 to 0.86, which means that the female/male 
activity gap decreased by 15 percent. In sum, in Hungary women’s educational levels, skills 
and economic activity are close or similar to those of men.  
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Figure 1: Female/male ratio of completed university degree and activity rate 
 
Dashed line: Female/male ratio of completed university degree (individuals above age 25), 1950-2010. Source: 
authors’ calculation based on data of Barro and Lee (2013). 
Solid line: female/male ratio in activity rate (individuals aged 25-59), 1996-2015. Source: authors’ calculation 
based on data of Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_argan&lang=en). 
 
The tension between gender attitudes and the economic reality is reflected in data from 
European Institute for Gender Equality’s (EIGE) Gender Equality Index Report (European 
Institute for Gender Equality, 2013). While traditional attitudes in Hungary are among the 
strongest in Europe, gender gap indicators related to labor force, the economy and education 
are around or below average in Hungary. For example, Hungary is below the EU-27 average 
and has the median value (the 14th position) regarding the gender gap in average monthly 
earnings. The country is also below the EU-27 average and in the lowest third among the EU-
27 countries regarding the gender gap in full-time equivalent participation in labor force, in the 
representation on boards of the largest companies, and in the representation in the central bank’s 
decision-making body. The gender gap in Hungary regarding the number of those with tertiary 
10 
 
education is also below average and has the median value among the EU-27. Klesment and Van 
Bavel (2015), using EU-SILC data, report that the share of women aged 25-45 years with a 
„breadwinning role” (she earns 51-100% of the couple income) ranges from 14.5% to 33.9% in 
Europe with an average of 21.9%. In Hungary, 23.4% of the women earn more than their 
partners that places the country 11th out of 27 countries. 
Using data from ISSP 1994, Lück (2005) provides additional evidence showing that in 
Eastern-Europe support for traditional gender roles and for female employment is high, which 
can be explained by economic necessities and the experience of socialism, that enforced female 
labor force participation. To sum up, it seems that Eastern-Europe (and Hungary) can be 
regarded as a special region where a significant group of people experience tensions between 
preferred gender roles and the economic reality, or between the cultural and structural 
phenomena of breadwinning (Zuo, 2004). This is also reflected in a “gender yo-yo effect”, 
where women are subjecting “to contradictory normative expectations about their ‘natural’ 
roles, while dragging them back and forth between work and home” (Takács, 2013, p. 200). 
4.  Data and empirical strategy 
4.1. Data 
Our analysis is based on the panel survey Turning Points of the Life Course conducted 
by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute (HDRI). We use the second wave of the 
survey (2004-2005) since only this wave includes variables measuring both life satisfaction and 
income of the respondent’s partner.  
In this survey, subjective well-being was measured with a global, single-item question 
about life satisfaction on an 11-point scale (ranging from 0 to 10): “How satisfied are you with 
the way your life’s worked out up till now?” Income of the respondent, income of her/his 
partner, and household income were measured also with single questions (“On the average what 
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is your monthly net income / the monthly net income of your spouse or partner?” and “What is 
the combined average monthly net income of your household?”). 
The initial sample size is 13,542. We exclude respondents who did not have a partner 
(4,657 observations) or lived with a same-sex partner (3 observations). Respondents with 
missing life satisfaction and income variables are also excluded (26 and 842 observations, 
respectively). We also exclude respondents with partners below age 21 or above age 79 (142 
observations). Two observations are excluded because of missing sampling weight variable. 
The final sample size is 7,870. 
Intra-couple income distribution is measured with the woman’s share in the couple’s 















iI  is the woman’s total monthly net income, 
M
iI  is the man’s total monthly net 
income. iWRI  is the woman’s relative income for individual i. If individual i is male, iWRI  
measures his partner’s share in his and his partner’s total income; if individual i is female, iWRI  
measures her share in her and her partner’s total income. iWRI  takes the value 0 if only the man 
has an income; it takes the value 1 if only the woman has an income; and it takes the value 0.5 
if individual incomes are equal.  
The mean of WRI is 0.414, and it is similar for female (0.418) and male (0.411) 
respondents. 33.0% of the respondents report that WRI is at least 0.5, and 21.2% report that the 
woman has higher income than her partner. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the variable. 
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Figure 2: The distribution of women’s relative income 
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
We estimate a linear relationship between the woman’s relative income and satisfaction, 





iii DWRIDWRIS  ++++= X3210 , 
where iS  is the life satisfaction of individual i, iWRI  denotes the woman’s relative 
income for individual i, WiD  and 
M
iD  are indicator variables that take the value 1 for women 
and men, respectively. iX  is a vector of the personal characteristics of individual i.
5 
We focus on coefficients 1  and 2  that show the relationship between the woman’s 
share in the couple’s total income and life satisfaction for women and men, respectively. A 
negative 1  or 2  coefficient indicates that the higher the woman’s relative income, the lower 
 
5 Summary statistics of these variables are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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the life satisfaction of the female or male member of the couple. Positive coefficients indicate 
reversed correlation. 
The omitted variable bias could be a potential problem in our estimation, since the 
woman’s relative income correlates with several characteristics of the respondent and the 
household that might influence life satisfaction (e.g. health status of the household members, 
absolute income level, working hours).6 To address this endogeneity concern, in our models we 
use a rich set of control variables. These variables include the individual characteristics of the 
respondent’s and the partner’s: age, squared age, health status, education, labor force status, 
and working hours in the last week, as well as the respondent’s sex and personal total monthly 
net income. In addition, we control for other characteristics of the household: the household’s 
monthly net income, the number of adult household member (in addition to the respondent and 
her/his partner), the number of household members under aged 0-3, the number of household 
members under aged 4-17, indicators for health problems of other household members, arrears 
on utility bills in the last 12 months, flat size (square meters in a logarithmic form), and 
settlement type. 
After controlling these variables, 1  and 2  reflect (i) the effect of subjective and 
objective rewards of income (e.g. recognition of others, personal advantages, consumption 
opportunities in the household), and (ii) the effect of failure or success of the fulfilment of the 
prescribed gender roles. The former effect depends on the personal contribution to the 
household budget, i.e. the partner who contributes more might use more resources of the 
household, or might have greater influence on the decisions of the household (Lundberg and 
 
6 For example, respondents living in households where WRI is at least 0.5, i.e. the woman has equal or higher 
income than her partner, are more likely to have financial problems than respondents living in households where 
the man’s contribution is higher. They are more likely to have arrears on utility bills (17.5% vs. 13.2%, p=0.000), 
and report more often to have difficulties making ends meet (16.4% vs. 12.5%, p=0.000). In these households, the 
male partner is also more likely to have health problems (22.8% vs. 18.6%, p=0.000), and is more likely to be 
unemployed (10.3% vs. 0.9%, p=0.000). 
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Pollak, 1996; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Halleröd, 2005). Thus, the coefficient on the woman’s 
relative income is supposed to be positive for women and negative for men. On the other hand, 
traditional norms prescribe that the man should earn more than the woman. Evidently, these 
norms shape the intra-couple income distribution, however, the realized income distribution 
may differ from the preferred one due to a number of constrains. If a woman’s relative income 
is high, these traditional norms are violated (Furdyna et al., 2008), and the tension between the 
preferences and the economic reality could result in lower satisfaction. In this case the 
coefficient on the woman’s relative income is supposed to be negative both for women and 
men. In sum, 1  reflects the negative effect of gender norms and the positive effect of own 
income for women, whereas 2  reflects the negative effect of gender norms and the negative 
effect of the woman’s income for men.7 It means that if the point estimations of 1  and 2  are 
negative, we can interpret the results as the effect of preferred traditional gender roles. 
We estimate OLS regressions. Weights provided by the HDRI are used to adjust for the 
unequal inclusion probabilities. The standard error estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
5.  Results 
Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between women’s relative income and life satisfaction 
for women and men.8 In both groups, life satisfaction decreases the higher the woman’s share 
in the couple’s total income. For men, if the woman’s relative income is above 0.5, i.e. when 
the woman’s income is higher than the man’s, the relationship is steeper. The negative 
correlation for women suggests that we might explain the results with the expectations about 
 
7 Since we control for the effect of individual income (similar to Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015)), we suppose 
that the effect of gender roles is stronger than the effect of personal power, advantages, and consumption 
opportunities. Moreover, since women do not seem to gain the same advantages from earnings that men do (Steil 
and Weltman, 1991; Tichenor, 1999), we can also assume that the effect of personal power, advantages, and 
consumption opportunities is weaker for women than men. 
8 Non-parametric regressions using the lpoly function of Stata. 
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gender roles. If the woman’s income exceeds her husband’s, this might cause distress and 
conflicts.  
Figure 3: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income 
 
Note: Non-parametric regressions 
 
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 1. Model 1 includes only the woman’s 
relative income and the respondent’s sex as right-hand side variables. In this model, coefficients 
on the woman’s relative income are negative. The coefficient is larger in absolute terms for 
male respondents than for female respondents – in accordance with the results of Figure 2. 
Model 2 includes the control variables.9 After controlling for the respondent’s characteristics, 
partner’s characteristics, household’s characteristics, the woman’s relative income correlates 
negatively with life satisfaction both for men and women. The estimated coefficient is −0.861 
for male respondents, and −0.474 for female respondents. This means that if we compare two 
men with one standard deviation above and below men’s average income share (75% vs. 40%), 
 
9 The detailed results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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then we obtain a 0.30 point satisfaction difference.10 A similar comparison of two women with 
a 25% and 60% income share yields a 0.17 point difference.11 
It is worth noting that the woman’s relative income correlates negatively with life 
satisfaction not only for men but also for women, in contrast to results from West-European 
and American samples (Rogers and DeBoer, 2001; Bonke, 2008; Ahn et al., 2014). However, 
our results are similar to those obtained in countries where traditional gender norms are stronger 
(Zhang and Tsang, 2013; Ahn et al., 2014). 
Table 1: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income 








Woman × WRI -0.536 (0.180) 0.003 -0.474 (0.233) 0.042 
Man × WRI -1.316 (0.189) 0.000 -0.861 (0.252) 0.001 
Controls No   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.012   0.173   
N 7870   7870   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: personal income; household income; 
respondent’s sex, age, squared age, education, labor force status, working hours in the last week, health problems; partner’s 
age, squared age, education, labor force status, working hours in the last week, health problems; number of household members 
aged 0-3; number of household members aged 4-17; number of adult household members; health problems of other household 
members; type of relationship; flat size (in logarithmic form); arrears on utility bills in the last 12 months; settlement type. 
Dummies are included for missing regressors. 
 
Since our regression model includes the most important characteristics of the partners 
and the household, in accordance with the previous literature (Rogers and DeBoer, 2001; 
Furdyna et al., 2008; Ahn et al., 2014) we can interpret the negative coefficients as the impact 
of traditional gender norms, i.e. as the impact of the prescription that a man should earn more 
than his partner. These traditional norms imply that the higher the woman’s economic 
 
10 If the relative incomes are 75% and 40%, the women’s relative incomes (WRI) are 25% and 60%, respectively. 
Therefore, the satisfaction difference is (0.25 − 0.60) × −0.861 = 0.30. 
11 The difference is (0.25 − 0.60) × −0.474 = 0.17. 
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contribution the more the man’s breadwinning role is questioned which leads to lower life 
satisfaction. 
5.1. Robustness of the results 
Next, we test the robustness of the estimations. On the one hand, we use restricted (more 
homogeneous) samples, additional controls and alternative estimation methods (Table 2), on 
the other hand, we allow a non-linear association between life satisfaction and the woman’s 
relative income (Figure 4).  
The results obtained from the restricted samples are shown in Table 2. Row 1 includes 
observations where both the respondents and their partners have positive incomes. Then, we 
restrict the sample to 25-60 year-old respondents with 25-60 year-old partners (Row 2). The 
next model includes observations where both the respondents and their partners are 25-60 year-
old and have positive incomes (Row 3). In Row 4, we add a more extensive set of control 
variables. The model includes additional controls for characteristics related to financial 
situation of the household. We also add a variable measuring how housework is divided 
between the partners, since several studies find that women who earn more than their partners 
“do gender”, i.e. there is a curvilinear relationship between woman’s relative income and 
housework for women (e.g. Brines, 1994; Bittman et al., 2003; Schneider, 2011) which might 
explain the negative coefficient among women in the main model (Mencarini and Sironi, 2012). 
Variables controlling for fertility history (number of children the respondent has) and fertility 
intentions, and controlling for outsourcing of child care and housework are also included since 
these variables might be correlated both with life satisfaction and women’s relative income. 
Next, we estimate the same model separately for women and for men (Row 5 and Row 6). With 
these specifications, we allow that the control variables have different coefficients by sex of the 
respondents. In every model, the main coefficients have similar signs and similar magnitudes 
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to the results reported in Table 1. However, most of the estimations are less precise because of 
the smaller sample sizes. 
In Row 7, we estimate an ordered logit model rather than OLS. We also estimate a 
Probit-adapted OLS (POLS) model (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008) that considers the 
categorical life satisfaction variable as ordinal, and cardinalizes it by assuming that satisfaction 
is normally distributed. Using the cardinalized satisfaction variable, a standard OLS estimation 
can be applied (Row 8). The overall conclusion of this exercise is that the association of the 




12 The estimated coefficients of the POLS method have a smaller magnitude because the variance of the 




Table 2: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, robustness analyses 
  Woman × WRI Man × WRI   
  B SE p B SE p Adjusted R2 N 
(1) Both partners have positive income -0.472 (0.272) 0.083 -0.890 (0.285) 0.002 0.175 7493 
(2) Age: 25-60 -0.494 (0.264) 0.062 -0.908 (0.294) 0.002 0.200 5433 
(3) 
Both partners have positive income, age: 
25-60 
-0.539 (0.316) 0.088 -0.783 (0.337) 0.020 0.204 5132 
(4) With additional controls -0.483 (0.228) 0.035 -0.826 (0.247) 0.001 0.187 7870 
(5) With additional controls, only women -0.498 (0.272) 0.067 - - - 0.169 4134 
(6) With additional controls, only men - - - -0.770 (0.299) 0.010 0.200 3736 
(7) Ordered logit -0.493 (0.253) 0.051 -0.904 (0.273) 0.001 0.049a 7870 
(8) Probit-adapted OLS -0.245 (0.121) 0.043 -0.431 (0.129) 0.001 0.167 7870 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s relative income. All regressions include the same control variables as in Table 1. Additional 
controls in Row 4-6: household asset index (in logarithmic form), number of rooms in the flat (in logarithmic form), division of housework, division of housework × woman, fertility intentions, 
number of children of the respondent, the household make use of day care center or babysitter, the housework is (at least partially) done by someone not living in the household. Dummies are 
included for missing regressors. 





Next, we test whether the results remain similar if we allow the relationship between 
life satisfaction and the woman’s relative income to be non-linear. For example, if equal 
contribution is preferred, then we should observe a reverse U-shaped relationship. We check 
this in two ways. First, we include squared terms for the woman’s relative income in the models. 
Second, we replace the original variable with ten categorical variables: they indicate if the 
woman’s relative income is between 0.0 and 0.1, 0.1 and 0.2, … 0.9 and 1.0. Figure 4 depicts 
the results.13 Allowing non-linear effects does not change the main conclusion: life satisfaction 
of both women and men is lower when the woman’s relative income is higher, and we do not 
observe a strong reverse U-shaped relationship. These results suggest that the relationship 
between woman’s relative income and satisfaction is close to linear.14 




13 Detailed results are in Table A3 and Table A4 in the Appendix. 
14 Nevertheless, we also estimate a regression model with binary variables indicating that the woman’s relative 




5.2.1. Preferred gender norms 
If our interpretation is correct and the negative coefficients on the woman’s relative income is 
mainly caused by the impact of traditional gender norms, then the estimated coefficients should 
be stronger for those who prefer traditional gender roles and should be weaker (or even zero or 
positive) for those who prefer egalitarian gender roles. The moderating effect of traditional 
values has rarely been tested in the literature. Nevertheless, most papers that have found that 
the woman’s relative income had a negative effect interpreted these results as the effect of the 
male breadwinner mentality (e.g. Rogers and DeBoer, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2015).  
To test the moderating effect of gender norms, we split the sample into two groups by 
gender values. We construct a variable that measures preference for traditional gender roles, 
using respondents’ agreement with the following five statements: 
1. Overall, men make better political leaders than women. 
2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. 
3. If parents get divorced, it is better for the child to stay with the mother than with the 
father. 
4. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 
5. Working for pay should be more important for the man, while looking after the home 
and children should be more important for the woman, even if both have jobs. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the first four statements on a 
5-point scale (from 1 – ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 – ‘strongly agree’) and with the fifth statement 
on a 3-point scale (‘disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, or ‘agree’). The measure of attitudes 
toward gender norms is created as a principal component of these five variables.15 Then using 
 
15 The results are similar when the variable is calculated as the mean of the five variables. 
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this new variable, we divide the sample into two groups: respondents above the average, who 
prefer more traditional gender norms, and respondents with below average traditional gender 
attitudes.16 
We regressed life satisfaction on the woman’s relative income interacted with the 
respondent’s sex and the indicator variables of the two gender norm groups.17 Table 3 reports 
the results. The estimated coefficient for women with below average traditional attitudes is 
close to zero (−0.201), whereas the coefficient for men with below average traditional attitudes 
is considerably smaller than in the whole sample (−0.437). For respondents with traditional 
gender attitudes, the estimated coefficients are considerably higher: −0.794 for women, and 
−1.176 for men. These coefficients are significantly higher in absolute terms than coefficients 
for respondents with below average traditional gender attitudes both for women and men (p-
values on the test of equal coefficients are 0.091 and 0.038, respectively).  
These results confirm that preferred gender norms indeed play an important role in the 
explanation of the negative correlation between the woman’s relative income and life 
satisfaction. The woman’s relative income and life satisfaction correlate negatively primarily 
for those who prefer traditional gender roles; however, there are zero or negative but 
insignificant correlations for those with more equal gender norms. Our results corroborate the 
finding of Furdyna et al. (2008), who showed that dissatisfaction among those with traditional 
conceptions of gender role ensues when traditional male breadwinning expectations are 
unfulfilled. 
 
16 We have decided to use this cut point to have a sufficient number of observations in both groups. The cut point 
is 3.45 on the original 1 to 5 scale. 
17 Technically, the regression model consists of four three-way-interaction terms, the main effects of the sex of the 
respondent and the gender norm groups (two dummy variables), and the two-way interactions between the latter 
two variables (one interaction term). The direct effect of women’s relative income is excluded – as from the main 
model above. The four three-way-interaction terms measure the effect of women’s relative income for those 
women and men who prefer more equal gender roles, among those women and men who prefer more traditional 
gender roles. This specification is identical to a specification that consists of a three-way-interaction term and all 
the possible two-way-interaction terms and the three main effects. The advantage of our specification is that the 
four coefficients/effects and their significance we are interested in are presented without any additional calculation. 
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Woman × Traditional attitudes: lower level × WRI -0.201 (0.279) 0.471 
Woman × Traditional attitudes: higher level × WRI -0.794 (0.316) 0.012 
Man × Traditional attitudes: lower level × WRI -0.437 (0.308) 0.156 
Man × Traditional attitudes: higher level × WRI -1.176 (0.318) 0.000 
Controls Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.174   
N 7363   
Dependent variables: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: 
same control variables as in Table 1, and additional control variables: gender role attitudes, respondent’s sex × gender role 
attitudes. Dummies are included for missing regressors, except of gender role attitudes. 
5.2.2. Type of relationship 
There is evidence from previous research that cohabiters are less committed to their relationship 
and to their partner than married people (Nock, 1995; Smock, 2000; Stanley, Whitton and 
Markman, 2004). Thomson and Colella (1992) found that cohabiters define marriage 
individualistic rather than in couple terms (see also Rosenblatt and Budd, 1975). In a sample of 
Chinese married women, Zhang and Tsang (2013) found that women married to a husband with 
a lower income were less happy with their marriage than women married to a husband with a 
higher or equal income. However, this result is moderated by being more strongly committed 
to the relationship. Among those with higher commitments, there was no correlation between 
the woman’s relative income and marital happiness, whereas among those with lower 
commitments there was a negative correlation. They argue that a relation-oriented exchange 
model might explain the results. According to this model partners see themselves as a “mutually 
dependent dyad whose personal interests may be closely identified with the collective well-
being” (p. 1577). Those who are more committed to their relationship consider not only the 
economic contributions to the marriage, but also the global contribution by their partner.  
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In this section, we test whether the effect of the woman’s relative income differs for 
cohabiting and married people. Weaker “couple identity” , i.e. the partners are less likely to 
think of “the relationship as a team, in contrast to viewing it as two separate individuals” 
(Stanley and Markman, 1992, p. 596), might enhance the effect of preferred gender norms. On 
the other hand, higher commitment or stronger “couple identity” might make the source of 
household income less important. It is also possible that married women are more sympathizing 
when their partner’s ability to contribute resources is limited which has positive consequences 
on the satisfaction of both the female and the male partner. If commitment to the relationship 
and to the partner indeed tends to “overwrite” the effect of traditionally prescribed gender roles 
(and the effect of personal power, advantages, and consumption opportunities), then the 
estimated coefficients should be higher (i.e. negative but closer to 0, or positive) for married 
people. We examine this heterogeneity by regressing life satisfaction on the woman’s relative 
income in subsamples of married and cohabiting respondents.18  
Table 4 presents the results. The estimated coefficient on the woman’s relative income 
is −0.487 for married women, and −0.678 for married men. The coefficients are significant at 
the 10 percent and at the 5 percent level, respectively. For cohabiting respondents, satisfaction 
correlates more negatively with the woman’s share in the couple’s total income: the estimated 
coefficients are −0.619 and −1.622 for women and men, respectively, however because of the 
smaller sample size, the estimations are less precise, and only the latter is statistically 
significant.19 
 
18 One can also reasonably assume that gender norms of married respondents are more traditional than those of 
cohabiters. However, in our sample the difference between the two groups is small. The mean of the principal 
component measuring traditional gender norm (rescaled to the original 1-5 scale) is 3.48 among the married and 
3.30 among the cohabiters. 




These results suggest that personal commitment might moderate the relationship of 
women’s relative income and life satisfaction. Higher commitment or stronger “couple 
identity” might eliminate in some degree the effect of the traditional gender roles.  The lower 
coefficients for married respondents also fit well into the literature about the protective 
characteristics of marriage (Ross, Mirowsky and Goldsteen, 1990; Wilson and Oswald, 2005; 
Rendall et al., 2011).20 
Table 4: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income by type of relationship 








Woman × WRI -0.487 (0.256) 0.057 -0.619 (0.605) 0.307 
Man × WRI -0.678 (0.273) 0.013 -1.622 (0.628) 0.010 
Controls Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.152   0.245   
N 6841   1029   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: 
same control variables as in Table 1. Dummies are included for missing regressors. 
 
Next, we analyze the moderating effect of preferred gender roles by type of relationship. 
We run similar models as in Table 3 for the subsamples of married and cohabiting respondents. 
Table 5 shows the results of this exercise. The general pattern is similar to the patterns above. 
Coefficients for those with high levels of traditional attitudes are more negative than for those 
with low levels of traditional attitudes, and coefficients for cohabiters are more negative than 
for married people. For respondents with traditional values, the coefficients on the woman’s 
relative income are large in general, and are larger in absolute terms for cohabiters than for 
married people (−1.574 vs. −0.738 for women, and −2.292 vs. −0.921 for men). For respondents 
 
20 There are alternative explanations. It is possible that cohabiters prefer one-earner families. Cohabiters might 
respond less supportively to the man’s (relative) income disadvantages. It is also possible that cohabiters care more 
for intra-couple income distribution, i.e. they are more likely than married people to compare their income to their 




with low levels of traditional attitudes, estimated coefficients are close to zero and are 
insignificant (−0.286 for married women, 0.186 for cohabiting women, and −0.257 for married 
men). Only the coefficient for cohabiting men was negative but insignificant (−1.008). The 
larger negative coefficient in this group might be explained by the fact that this coefficient – 
beside the effect of failure or success of fulfilment of prescribed gender roles – also reflects the 
effect of personal power, advantages, and consumption opportunities, that are supposed to be 
negative for men.  
Table 5: The moderating effect of preferred gender roles by type of relationship 








Woman × Traditional 
attitudes: lower level × WRI 
-0.286 (0.303) 0.345 0.186 (0.775) 0.810 
Woman × Traditional 
attitudes: higher level × WRI 
-0.738 (0.343) 0.031 -1.574 (0.871) 0.071 
Man × Traditional attitudes: 
lower level × WRI 
-0.257 (0.329) 0.436 -1.008 (0.848) 0.235 
Man × Traditional attitudes: 
higher level × WRI 
-0.921 (0.345) 0.008 -2.292 (0.780) 0.003 
Controls Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.151   0.257   
N 6415   948   
Dependent variables: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: 
same control variables as in Table 1, and additional control variables: gender role attitudes, respondent’s sex × gender role 
attitudes. Dummies are included for missing regressors, except of gender role attitudes. 
6.  Limitations 
This paper has a number of limitations. First, the income data are not ideal since they were 
measured with single questions. Second, due to the lack of dyadic data respondents were asked 
about their partner’s income which may be biased. Prefered contributions to the household 
budget might influence the reported income of the partner. However, it worth to note that there 
is no difference in WRI by respondent’s sex which suggest that reporting bias is not a serious 
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problem. Third, using cross-sectional data we are not able to establish a causal relationship 
between the woman’s relative income and life satisfaction. While we use a rich set of control 
variables and show empirically that gender norms can explain the negative coefficients, 
longitudinal data would be needed to estimate causal effects. 
7.  Summary 
Using nationally representative data from Hungary, we have examined the association between 
intra-couple income distribution and subjective well-being. On the one hand, in Hungary the 
acceptance of traditional values and the prevalence of traditional gender roles are high 
compared to Europe. On the other hand, the support for female employment, labor force 
participation and relative education of women is also (relatively) high, providing some tension 
between attitudes and the economic reality, or in other words between the cultural and structural 
sides of equality between women and men.  
We have shown that the association between the woman’s relative income (the woman’s 
share of the couple’s total income) and life satisfaction is negative for both men and women. 
Because we control for financial disadvantages on the individual and household level, the socio-
economic and job characteristics of the respondent and their partner, we can interpret the results 
as the impact of traditional gender roles and the widespread prevalence of the traditional male 
breadwinner mentality in Hungary. The higher the woman’s economic contribution the more 
the man’s breadwinning role is questioned, which leads to lower life satisfaction. These results 
are in line with the findings of previous research based on data from countries with traditional 
gender norms (Zhang and Tsang, 2013; Ahn et al., 2014). 
We have shown that gender norms moderate the negative association. For those with 
low levels of traditional gender attitudes, the woman’s relative income is not or only moderately 
associated with life satisfaction, whereas for those who prefer traditional gender roles, the 
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negative association is much stronger. This finding supports the interpretation that gender 
norms explain the negative coefficients. Respondents with traditional values might feel distress 
and dissatisfaction when a woman’s proportional contribution increases and the man’s 
breadwinning role is questioned. 
Comparing married and cohabiting respondents, we have found significant differences 
between the effects of the woman’s relative income. The coefficients were larger in absolute 
terms for cohabiting respondents, which suggests that personal commitment might moderate 
the effect.  
Tension between gender norms and the economic reality is likely to be growing in the 
future, unless there is a substantial change in gender norms. The implications of our results 
relate to this tension. First, our paper might contribute to understanding why Eastern Europeans 
(Sanfey and Teksoz, 2007; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009), and more specifically Hungarians 
are dissatisfied (Lelkes, 2006; Helliwell et al., 2015). Our results suggest that the widespread 
prevalence of traditional gender norms in the region contributes to this dissatisfaction. Second, 
there is evidence to suggest that over time a counter-normative gender structure (i.e. dual-earner 
households or strong breadwinning role of women) could induce changes in attitudes (Zuo, 
2004), and qualitative results show that tension-free family life arrangements could be produced 
in families where the main breadwinner is the woman even in Hungary (Neményi and Takács, 
2016). However, our results imply that espousing egalitarian attitudes regarding gender roles 
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Table A1: Summary statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Life satisfaction 6.794 1.888 0 10 7870 
Woman’s relative income (%) 0.414 0.169 0 1 7870 
Household income (1000 HUF) 163.2 100.9 3 1500 7870 
Personal income (1000 HUF) 72.4 57.1 0 1000 7870 
Female 0.501 0.500 0 1 7870 
Type of relationship: marriage 0.856 0.352 0 1 7870 
Type of relationship: cohabitation 0.144 0.352 0 1 7870 
Traditional attitudes: higher level 0.502 0.500 0 1 7363 
Traditional attitudes: lower level 0.498 0.500 0 1 7363 
Age 47.6 14.1 21 79 7870 
Education: primary school 0.241 0.428 0 1 7870 
Vocational training school 0.330 0.470 0 1 7870 
High school 0.243 0.429 0 1 7870 
Tertiary school 0.185 0.388 0 1 7870 
Labor force status: Employed 0.499 0.500 0 1 7860 
Self-employed 0.063 0.244 0 1 7860 
Occasional work 0.009 0.094 0 1 7860 
Unemployed 0.042 0.202 0 1 7860 
Retired 0.193 0.395 0 1 7860 
Disability pension 0.097 0.296 0 1 7860 
On maternity leave 0.054 0.226 0 1 7860 
Student 0.002 0.047 0 1 7860 
Other inactive 0.040 0.197 0 1 7860 
Working hours in the last week: 0 hour 0.003 0.054 0 1 4149 
1-34 hours 0.108 0.310 0 1 4149 
35-40 hours 0.585 0.493 0 1 4149 
41 hours or more 0.304 0.460 0 1 4149 
Activity limitation 0.278 0.448 0 1 7865 
Partner's age 47.6 14.1 21 79 7870 
Partner' education: primary school 0.237 0.425 0 1 7870 
Vocational training school 0.323 0.468 0 1 7870 
High school 0.254 0.436 0 1 7870 
Tertiary school 0.185 0.389 0 1 7870 
Partner's labor force status: Employed 0.461 0.498 0 1 7870 
Self-employed 0.074 0.261 0 1 7870 
Occasional work 0.012 0.110 0 1 7870 
Unemployed 0.043 0.202 0 1 7870 
Retired 0.217 0.412 0 1 7870 
Disability pension 0.099 0.298 0 1 7870 
On maternity leave 0.055 0.227 0 1 7870 
Student 0.003 0.051 0 1 7870 
Other inactive 0.038 0.191 0 1 7870 
Partner's working hours in the last week: 0 hour 0.000 0.000 0 0 4237 
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1-34 hours 0.085 0.278 0 1 4237 
35-40 hours 0.603 0.489 0 1 4237 
41 hours or more 0.312 0.464 0 1 4237 
Partner's activity limitation 0.107 0.309 0 1 7834 
Household was unable to pay utility bills in the last 
12 months 
0.146 0.354 0 1 7855 
Adult household members (in addition to the 
respondent and her/his partner): 1 
0.618 0.486 0 1 7870 
Adult household members: 2 0.236 0.425 0 1 7870 
Adult household members: 3 0.116 0.320 0 1 7870 
Adult household members: 4 or more 0.030 0.171 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 0–3: 0 0.870 0.336 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 0–3: 1 0.112 0.315 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 0–3: 2 or more 0.018 0.133 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 4–17: 0 0.636 0.481 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 4–17: 1 0.194 0.396 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 4–17: 2 0.126 0.331 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 4–17: 3 0.035 0.184 0 1 7870 
Household members aged 4–17: 14 or more 0.009 0.093 0 1 7870 
Budapest (capital) 0.139 0.346 0 1 7870 
City 0.514 0.500 0 1 7870 
Village 0.348 0.476 0 1 7870 
Ln(Dwelling size - m2) 4.357 0.381 2.996 5.991 7822 




Table A2: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income 








Woman × WRI -0.536 (0.180) 0.003 -0.474 (0.233) 0.042 
Man × WRI -1.316 (0.189) 0.000 -0.861 (0.252) 0.001 
Woman -0.058 (0.117) 0.620 0.049 (0.198) 0.805 
Household income    0.002 (0.000) 0.000 
Personal income    0.001 (0.001) 0.210 
Type of relationship: marriage    0.525 (0.067) 0.000 
Age    -0.067 (0.017) 0.000 
Age squared    0.001 (0.000) 0.001 
Education (ref. cat.: Primary)       
Vocational training school    0.048 (0.066) 0.468 
High school    0.123 (0.071) 0.084 
Tertiary    0.300 (0.081) 0.000 
Labor force status (ref. cat.: Employed)       
Self-employed    -0.114 (0.076) 0.133 
Occasional work    -0.803 (0.271) 0.003 
Unemployed    -0.711 (0.154) 0.000 
Retired    -0.130 (0.127) 0.308 
Disability pension    -0.408 (0.130) 0.002 
On maternity leave    -0.138 (0.163) 0.396 
Student    -0.154 (0.364) 0.672 
Other inactive    -0.316 (0.158) 0.046 
Working hours in the last week (ref. cat.: 
1-34 hours) 
     
 
0 hour    0.667 (0.459) 0.147 
35-40 hours    -0.224 (0.092) 0.015 
41 hours or more    -0.226 (0.099) 0.023 
Activity limitation    -0.514 (0.056) 0.000 
Partner's age    -0.028 (0.016) 0.087 
Partner's age squared    0.000 (0.000) 0.069 
Partner's education (ref. cat.: Primary)        
Vocational training school    0.093 (0.065) 0.155 
High school    0.168 (0.072) 0.020 
Tertiary    0.213 (0.082) 0.009 
Partner's labor force status (ref. cat.: 
Employed) 
     
 
Self-employed    0.198 (0.075) 0.008 
Occasional work    -0.001 (0.207) 0.998 
Unemployed    -0.134 (0.155) 0.388 
Retired    0.115 (0.127) 0.365 
Disability pension    0.216 (0.132) 0.102 
On maternity leave    0.095 (0.160) 0.550 
Student    0.261 (0.392) 0.505 
Other inactive    -0.111 (0.161) 0.489 
Partner's working hours in the last week 
(ref. cat.: 1-34 hours) 
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35-40 hours    0.011 (0.100) 0.913 
41 hours or more    0.037 (0.107) 0.731 
Partner's activity limitation    -0.257 (0.083) 0.002 
Household was unable to pay utility bills 
in the last 12 months 
   
-0.623 (0.067) 0.000 
Adult household members (in addition to 
the respondent and her/his partner) (ref. 
cat.: 1) 
     
 
Adult household members: 2    -0.211 (0.053) 0.000 
Adult household members: 3    -0.155 (0.071) 0.029 
Adult household members: 4 or more    -0.146 (0.128) 0.255 
Household members aged 0–3 (ref. cat.: 
0) 
     
 
Household members aged 0–3: 1    0.065 (0.095) 0.495 
Household members aged 0–3: 2 or more    0.165 (0.177) 0.351 
Household members aged 4–17 (ref. cat.: 
0) 
   
    
Household members aged 4–17: 1    -0.025 (0.056) 0.650 
Household members aged 4–17: 2    -0.097 (0.067) 0.143 
Household members aged 4–17: 3    -0.229 (0.134) 0.088 
Household members aged 4–17: 4 or more    0.140 (0.264) 0.596 
Ln(Dwelling size - m2)    0.639 (0.064) 0.000 
Other household member's activity 
limitation 
   
-0.038 (0.097) 0.696 
Settlement (ref. cat.: Village)        
Budapest (capital)    0.040 (0.074) 0.589 
City    0.079 (0.047) 0.095 
Constant 7.205 (0.084)  6.952 (0.198) 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.012   0.173   
N 7870   7870   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Dummies are included for missing regressors. 
 
Table A3: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, allowing non-linear effects 
 B Robust SE p 
Joint p-
value 
Woman × WRI -1.217 (0.572) 0.033 
0.047 
Woman × WRI - squared 0.836 (0.582) 0.151 
Man × WRI -0.645 (0.605) 0.287 
0.003 
Man × WRI - squared -0.253 (0.646) 0.695 
Controls Yes    
Adjusted R2 0.173    
N 7870    
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: same control variables as in Table 1. Dummies 
are included for missing regressors. 
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Table A4: Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, categorical variables 
 B Robust SE p 
Woman × WRI: 0.0-0.1 0.337 (0.173) 0.051 
Woman × WRI: 0.1-0.2 -0.079 (0.170) 0.640 
Woman × WRI: 0.2-0.3 0.237 (0.103) 0.021 
Woman × WRI: 0.3-0.4 -0.066 (0.083) 0.426 
Woman × WRI: 0.4-0.5 ref.   
Woman × WRI: 0.5-0.6 -0.176 (0.077) 0.023 
Woman × WRI: 0.6-0.7 -0.221 (0.134) 0.099 
Woman × WRI: 0.7-0.8 -0.191 (0.208) 0.360 
Woman × WRI: 0.8-0.9 -0.322 (0.340) 0.343 
Woman × WRI: 0.9-1.0 -0.045 (0.263) 0.863 
Man × WRI: 0.0-0.1 0.165 (0.178) 0.354 
Man × WRI: 0.1-0.2 0.101 (0.141) 0.475 
Man × WRI: 0.2-0.3 0.025 (0.112) 0.820 
Man × WRI: 0.3-0.4 -0.001 (0.088) 0.992 
Man × WRI: 0.4-0.5 ref.   
Man × WRI: 0.5-0.6 -0.250 (0.082) 0.002 
Man × WRI: 0.6-0.7 -0.228 (0.139) 0.102 
Man × WRI: 0.7-0.8 -0.420 (0.193) 0.030 
Man × WRI: 0.8-0.9 -0.160 (0.372) 0.668 
Man × WRI: 0.9-1.0 -0.557 (0.344) 0.105 
Controls Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.174   
N 7870   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: same control variables as in Table 1. Dummies 
are included for missing regressors. 
